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 Summary report 
NATO and Deterrence 
 
In December 2015, the Center for War Studies, Chatham House, and the Polish Institute for International 
Affairs convened a group of international security experts and policy practitioners from a number of NATO 
member states. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss how and whether NATO can effectively use 
deterrence as a tool to address today’s dynamic security environment. This report reflects many of the 
main themes and conclusions from the discussions, and includes recommendations on priority issues that 
should be addressed in the upcoming 2016 Warsaw Summit. This is not intended as a full description of the 
debate, nor should it be seen as a consensus document. 
 
A Strategic Context of Uncertainty 
 A dynamic and changing security environment requires NATO to speed its decision-making 
procedures and culture. NATO consensus is a key element of NATO’s deterrent capacity, but the 
way in which consensus is generated and maintained may not be adequate to deter new and fast-
moving threats. The speed of political decision-making is a key issue; the authority to mobilize and 
deploy forces delegated to the military chain of command another. In the post-Cold War years, 
NATO delegated very little such authority and grew accustomed to an easy pace of decision-
making. Business as usual is increasingly not an option in today’s environment. 
 The dividing line between deterrence and defense can be hard to draw. In theory, the distinction 
is easy: deterrence is about avoiding war by threatening intolerable pain; defense about the 
capacity to hold your ground in a fight. In practice, it is not that simple. NATO has always blended 
defense and deterrence, as in the Flexible Response strategy of the Cold War. Allies simply differ in 
their preferences regarding the right mix, and NATO’s challenge is to generate both consensus and 
strategy. It was difficult during the Cold War, and it remains difficult today. 
 U.S. leadership remains critically important but the long-term implications for NATO of 
transitioning U.S. strategic priorities (e.g. the rebalance to Asia) are unclear. The United States 
has taken the lead in reassuring NATO’s eastern-most allies in response to Russia’s aggressions in 
Ukraine, but has simultaneously made clear its expectation that European allies must do more of 
the heavy lifting and that the United States may prefer to contribute to a coalition rather than lead 
one. The lack of alternate leadership complicates the task of crafting the political resolve on which 
a policy of deterrence must rest. 
 NATO’s force posture is challenged in several respects. NATO’s conventional forces have become 
too slow and too light, and while the reforms agreed upon at the 2014 Wales summit point in the 
right direction, more work needs to be done. NATO is politically divided, moreover, on the need to 
revise the 1997 Founding Act with Russia, which not only promised partnership but also 
established that NATO would not forward deploy forces to the east but rather reinforce as 
required—a posture now overtly challenged by several allies. 
  
NATO’s Current Deterrence Capacity 
 Effective deterrence requires: a) credibility; b) capability; and c) cohesion.  All are in question 
today at NATO. Political will (credibility) is at times uncertain, capabilities are too slow to get off 
the ground (or back up), and while there is cohesion in action, it is not necessarily there for 
deterrence. 
 While questions regarding NATO’s deterrence capabilities abound, there are signs that NATO 
deterrence might already have worked. Russia has not challenged Baltic sovereignty since their 
inclusion in NATO; allies have acted cohesively on sanctions against Russia even at the cost to their 
own economies; and the effort to modernize NATO’s deterrence posture is strong and focused. 
 NATO must be cognizant that deterrence at heart is about the credibility of its response. NATO 
must move forward with deterrence and keep it simple. A clear message and political resolve 
define NATO’s most urgent task, even as there is work to do on NATO military forces.  
Hybrid Threats 
 NATO does not have to go hybrid in order to deter hybrid threats. Russia’s hybrid warfare is novel 
compared to the 1990s, but contains the same elements of subversion, propaganda, espionage, 
and resort to force that are familiar from the history of the Cold War and beyond. There should be 
a division of labor between the national level where nations must prepare broadly resilient 
societies and then the collective NATO level where adapted military forces must be in focus.  
 NATO must broaden its deterrence thinking from the land milieu to the other milieus of sea, air, 
and space. Russia can challenge NATO in all domains, and NATO should have responses ready, for 
instance to safeguard transatlantic fiber optic cables.  
Radical Threats 
 NATO has difficulty in generating consensus among the allies most affected by radicalism and 
terrorism. These radical threats emerge from failed states along NATO’s southern border, but they 
affect southern allies differently and connect to distinct national perspectives. To illustrate: France 
is ‘at war’ with Islamic State in Syria and Iraq; Turkey is concerned about a broader set of 
developments in Syria; and Greece and Italy are consumed by the influx of refugees and 
immigrants. NATO’s challenge of cohesion is thus greater to the south than to the east.  
 Deterrence is elusive when dealing with failed states. But preparedness, or resilience, can be an 
effective deterrence strategy for such threats.  Resilience is necessary among NATO members as 
well as partners. Domestic resilience - to withstand economic, security and political pressure - is 
vital. NATO members must do this nationally, and can assist with partners. But militarily NATO can 
also do more to broadly ‘prepare’ its own force posture by defining the right mix of tools, 
positioning forces, connecting them, and tying the prepared posture to its collective defense policy. 
Preparedness can play a significant role in particular to affect calculations of southern adversaries.  
 Crises to the south will pull NATO into the business of crisis management and capacity building 
and cause NATO’s distinction between collective defense and crisis management to blur. NATO 
should, therefore, be clear on what this distinction entails strategically and operationally. NATO 
can do both, but should not confuse the two. NATO should be attentive to the distinct meanings of 
preparedness and capacity building in each context, notably as they relate to NATO’s resolve to use 
force—a critical issue notably in collective defense—and the role and weight of external partners, 
which increase in matters of crisis management. 
 It is very hard to do deterrence in the south—policy instead tends to become focused on 
development or defense. In part, it is because we do not understand the extremists’ goals and so 
we cannot use ‘deterrence by denial’. And we cannot do ‘damage’—deterrence by punishment—as 
we cannot sustain a campaign to inflict pain as much as they can absorb it.  
Extended Deterrence 
 NATO has a dual extended deterrence challenge. It must be capable of reinforcing across the 
Atlantic, which has been a core NATO task from day one, and then also reach the relatively new 
easternmost territory towards Russia. Russia’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capacities are 
especially challenging, but Atlantic sea lines of communication ought to be of concern as well. The 
survivability, sustainability, and readiness of NATO forces should be reviewed in this light.  
 Nuclear issues are integral to a strategy of deterrence but politically highly sensitive. Russia is 
investing in nuclear modernization and uses nuclear deployments and exercises involving both 
conventional and nuclear forces to send signals to NATO. The vision of “nuclear zero” as part of a 
global disarmament deal is thus receding, and NATO allies must redefine the role for nuclear 
weapons within their deterrence posture. This will notably involve a new common understanding, 
on the one hand, of how U.S. nuclear weapons can extend deterrence to Europe and, on the other, 
how extended deterrence and disarmament diplomacy can be linked in new ways.  
 There is a real risk that NATO as a collective mechanism of transatlantic defense coordination is 
being marginalized. The United States tends now to bilateralize its defense relations to critical 
allies, in part because European allies have collectively failed to modernize their defense forces 
after the counter-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan. The core business of European defense 
could thus move outside NATO structures, leaving NATO disempowered. 
Compellence 
 NATO’s capacity to compel an adversary is intact but eroding. Compellence is the art of 
persuading an adversary to take certain actions using threats of force or the measured use of force, 
all while retaining the capacity to escalate and inflict additional pain. NATO’s clearest case of 
successful compellence is Serbia, which NATO engaged with limited force in Bosnia and Kosovo in 
the 1990s. This capacity to compel is eroding because NATO increasingly is no longer leading 
coalitions. Military operations now tend to be run by (mostly U.S.-led) coalitions outside NATO, 
partly on account of the degree of political controversy generated in the NAC by the active use of 
force, partly on account of wide disparities in military readiness among the allies. NATO is thus at 
risk of being reduced to a type of force-generating mechanism.  
 NATO must invest in its capacity to anchor operational coalitions in its midst. This capacity is 
largely hidden from view and consists of military and also political interoperability. Militarily it is a 
question of maintaining connected and ready multinational forces, and also of ensuring that even 
small or less capable allies inject forces into the packages that will form the nucleus of coalitions. 
Politically it is a question of strong ambassadorial networks—in Brussels but also and increasingly 
in Washington D.C.  
 NATO must maintain a collective capacity to compel Russia. In a more competitive relationship, 
NATO cannot take for granted Russia’s commitment to arms agreements and security guarantees: 
Russia has, in effect, abrogated the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty as well as the 
Budapest Memorandum safeguarding Ukraine’s territorial integrity. To persuade Russia to stick to 
such rules of the road, or to craft new rules of the road, NATO must compel—and therefore 
maintain a capacity to issue threats (however subtle) and back them with forces along the steps on 
the ladder of escalation.  
 Terrorist groups cannot be compelled. Compellence needs to have an alternative and NATO wants 
to ‘defeat’ terrorists.  However, it might be possible to compel individuals, whether terrorists or 
their supporters or sponsors.  
Moving Forward 
 NATO should also consider ways to reinforce political engagement at the highest political level. 
NATO heads of states and government, and also foreign ministers when meeting in the NAC, 
should regularly debate and address the fundamental bargains that sustain NATO—including the 
‘defense and détente’ policy vis-à-vis Russia and, most fundamentally, the transatlantic bargain 
that secures European support for U.S. leadership in return for security guarantees.  
 NATO needs to address the balance between its executive agency and its board of directors in 
order to deter effectively. The executive (the Secretary General and the Supreme Allied 
Commander) and the board of directors (the North Atlantic Council) have struggled to send the 
same message at times; the former have been criticized by the latter as being too forward leaning 
in their communication on Russia and deterrence. The messaging from both needs to be clear and 
aligned—both need to communicate deterrence to be effective. As threats become more flexible 
and fast moving, ways should be considered to bolster the executive arm. 
 NATO is struggling to locate the balance between speed and weight. Speed has been the focus of 
the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) that followed from the 2014 Wales summit, and it is both 
expensive and difficult. In the search to combine speed and weight, there is a real risk of 
frontloading the high readiness forces so that they become too heavy—too fat to fly. NATO must 
apply greater thought to the mobilization of its follow-on forces as a smooth and credible 
reinforcement of its high readiness forces, particularly as exterior lines of communication disfavor 
NATO in comparison to Russia’s interior lines of communication. Initial deterrence must be backed 
up. 
 NATO’s Allied Command Transformation (ACT) must be reformed. In its current shape, it is too 
small and too distantly located from the strategic headquarters in Brussels. NATO might want to 
consider moving ACT to Belgium and setting up a new Atlantic Naval Command in Norfolk.  
 To solidify its collective nature, NATO should reform its command structure (which has gone from 
35,000 in the 1970’s to around 6,500 today). Moving ACT to Belgium was touched upon above. 
NATO should more broadly consider how it could optimize the value it gains from the 6,500 
personnel in the full command structure: by introducing Areas of Responsibility (AOR) into the 
chain of command (current NATO HQs do not have AORs) and linking them more organically to the 
regional awareness and training and contingency planning expertise of national headquarters.  
  
 
